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Abstract
Background: The "place-consciousness" of public health professionals is on the rise as spatial
analyses and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are rapidly becoming key components of their
toolbox. However, "place" is most useful at its most precise, granular scale – which increases
identification risks, thereby clashing with privacy issues. This paper describes the views and
requirements of public health professionals in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data,
as collected through a web-based survey.
Methods: Perceptions on the impact of privacy were collected through a web-based survey
administered between November 2006 and January 2007. The survey targeted government, non-
government and academic GIS labs and research groups involved in public health, as well as public
health units (Canada), ministries, and observatories (UK). Potential participants were invited to
participate through personally addressed, standardised emails.
Results: Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 and 28 participated in the survey,
respectively. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%, and 86% for the UK. No response
differences were observed between the two countries. Ninety three percent of participants
indicated a requirement for personally identifiable data (PID) in their public health activities,
including geographic information. Privacy was identified as an obstacle to public health practice by
71% of respondents. The overall self-rated median score for knowledge of privacy legislation and
policies was 7 out of 10. Those who rated their knowledge of privacy as high (at the median or
above) also rated it significantly more severe as an obstacle to research (P < 0.001). The most
critical cause cited by participants in both countries was bureaucracy.
Conclusion: The clash between PID requirements – including granular geography – and limitations
imposed by privacy and its associated bureaucracy require immediate attention and solutions,
particularly given the increasing utilisation of GIS in public health. Solutions include harmonization
of privacy legislation with public health requirements, bureaucratic simplification, increased
multidisciplinary discourse, education, and development of toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for
using and reporting on disaggregate data.
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Although "place" has been coined one of the three pillars
of epidemiological data, only relatively recently has it gar-
nered significant attention in the public health field, as
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have increasingly
become more affordable, accessible, and intuitive.
Indeed, the public health community's "place-conscious-
ness" is on the rise as spatial analyses and GIS, now
defined as part of the medical and health literature [1-3],
are rapidly becoming key components of the public
health professional's toolbox [4].
Privacy, an evolving "principle as old as the common law"
[5], has been cited as an issue in a variety of public health
events, reports, and media releases [6-11]. So much so, in
fact, that one sometimes cannot help but wonder if pri-
vacy is, indeed, the enemy of public health [12], and
whether they could ever peacefully co-exist [13]. A distinc-
tion should here be made between the related concepts of
privacy, confidentiality, and security within the context of
the current discussion. Privacy is attributable to the indi-
vidual about whom identifiable information pertains,
and refers to that individual's right to control such infor-
mation, thereby freeing the individual from un-invited
intrusion and identification. Confidentiality obligates oth-
ers who have been entrusted with such information to
respect the individual's privacy, and is therefore attributa-
ble to third parties; a breach of confidentiality violates the
privacy of the individual because the individual has had
no control over the release of the data. Finally, security
refers to tools and methods used to safeguard confidenti-
ality and privacy [14,15]. This research deals specifically
with privacy issues as regulated and defined by legislation
and ethical guidelines surrounding consent. From within
this context, an individual's privacy is not deemed to have
been violated if data shared in the absence of consent can-
not be used to identify the individual. Exception clauses
generally exist in legislation, allowing authorities to
release personally identifiable data under various circum-
stances – such as where it is deemed to be in the best inter-
est of society or where it is impractical to obtain consent.
Examples include Section 60 of the UK's Health and Social
Care Act 2001 [16], and Sections 8 and 7 of Canada's Pri-
vacy Act [17] and Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act [18], respectively. While an
analysis of privacy legislation as it pertains to health data
and the concept of "place" is beyond the scope of this
paper, suffice it to say that such clauses are often ambigu-
ous and subjective, particularly when combined with
vague definitions of "sensitive personal information" and
the scale at which geographic data becomes "identifiable".
The concept of place, for example, is not explicitly speci-
fied as "sensitive personal data" in the UK's Data Protection
Act 1988 [19], nor in the generic EU Data Protection Direc-
tive of 1995 [20] (though it is explicitly mentioned in var-
ious telecommunications directives), but postcodes are
specifically mentioned in a 2005 NHS data protection and
medical research POSTnote [21]. In Canada's Privacy Act
[17], "address" is specifically listed as "personal informa-
tion", while in the Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Documents Act [18], it is not (though implied). Such
ambiguities deter the sharing of data, causing organisa-
tions and authorities to err on the side of caution and not
release identifying information [22], including spatial
data.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the increasing popularity
of "place" in public health has further exacerbated the
public health research-privacy debate. Traditional health-
data anonymisation techniques, such as pseudonymisa-
tion and aggregation, cannot be applied to spatial data
without significantly altering or destroying the spatial
relationships under investigation [23-26], and hence the
very reason for which they are to be used in the first place.
The problem with "place" is that it is most useful at its
most precise, granular scale [15,23]. Yet with increasing
spatial precision and accuracy comes a corresponding
increase in the risk of identification, and therefore a
breach of privacy [15]. This becomes particularly trouble-
some when the spatial data is linked to health, social or
demographic data. The development of methods by
which to mitigate these risks continues to be an active area
of research, but thus far, proposed solutions have limita-
tions, risks and tradeoffs, and lack guidelines on their
appropriate use. Consequently, the acquisition of geo-
graphic data tends to be either limited, or at a sub-optimal
or unusable scale. Not only do privacy issues impact data
acquisition and use for analysis, but also visualisation and
dissemination of the results. Researchers have been able
to "reverse engineer" maps, for example, to successfully
re-identify individuals [27-29].
While the debate between the fields of privacy and public
health has raged on for decades [5] despite their interde-
pendence on one another [14], tension continues to rise
in concert with the rampant growth of information tech-
nology and e-Health. From a health research perspective,
both Canada and the UK place strong emphasis on evi-
dence-based public health policies and services [6], yet in
both countries, this seems to be hampered by privacy
issues. While some argue that this debate is the product of
a lack of understanding of the legislation and regulations
by the public health community [14,30,31], there is little
in the way of formal collection and synthesis of the corre-
sponding views and perspectives of those directly
involved in public health activities. This paper describes
the views and requirements of public health professionals
in Canada and the UK on privacy issues and spatial data,
as collected through a web-based survey. Given that Can-
ada's health care and public health systems were bothPage 2 of 9
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continues to be studied by the other for improvements
and lessons learned [6,34], and that privacy issues for
public health have been cited in both, it is expected that
survey responses in the two countries will also be similar.
Methods
Development & Content
The survey was first developed on paper in the summer of
2006, and piloted with select public health individuals in
Canada and the UK. It was then submitted for privacy
assessment by the Access to Information and Privacy
Branch of Health Canada, and for ethics review and
approval from the Health Canada Research Ethics Board
and the Southwest Multicentre Research Ethics Commit-
tee in the UK. Throughout the process it was clear that the
survey would be developed as a closed web-based survey,
running between November 2006 and January 2007. The
final paper versions of the survey are provided (see Addi-
tional files 1, 2, 3) and can also be found on the research
website [35].
The paper survey was then converted to a web-version by
the ALPHA Project [36] team at the Public Health Agency
of Canada (PHAC), and piloted by the author and several
colleagues within the PHAC. The survey launch was
delayed by two weeks, with only some of the concerns
identified during the pilot being implemented due to lim-
itations of the ALPHA architecture. Issues and limitations
with the design of the web-based survey are addressed in
a later section.
Three versions of the survey were developed and
launched: Canada-English, Canada-French and UK-Eng-
lish. A summary of the survey's structure and contents is
given in Table 1.
Target
The survey targeted government, non-government and
academic GIS labs and research groups involved in public
health, as well as public health units (Canada), ministries,
and observatories (UK). Potential participants were iden-
tified through web searches of public health sites, mailing
databases, personal contact, referrals/word of mouth, and
postings on the research website [35], a PHAC Public
Health Portal website [37], and the NHS Public Health
Informatics Community website [38].
Participation
Potential participants were invited to participate through
a standardised but personally addressed email outlining
the reason for the invite, the mechanisms by which their
contact information was retrieved, a brief summary of the
research and survey, a description of the data handling
methods, an estimate of the time it would take to com-
plete the survey (approximately 20 minutes), a unique
user ID and password, the URL to the survey site, the URL
to the research website, and the principle investigator's
contact information.
The survey website had no other content. In order to par-
ticipate, invitees were required to (1) successfully log in,
and (2) consent to participation. Only the most recent
responses for any given user ID were collected, ensuring
only one survey was completed per participant. The con-
sent screen outlined the voluntary and anonymous nature
of the survey, indicated the approximate time it would
take to complete the survey, the risks and benefits to the
Table 1: Sections of the survey
Section Title Description
I A little about you... Participant scope, roles, use of GIS, etc
II Current access to data Asks participants with current access to PID to score 15 kinds of PID* on various 
dimensions, such as ease and frequency of access, usefulness and importance, etc.
III No current access to data Asks participants without current access to PID to score same as above
IV Privacy issues Collects participant opinions on the overall impact of restricted access to PID on 
public health practice (research, surveillance, health service delivery, etc)
V Current data holdings and provision to others... Collects information on the sharing of PID within and between participant 
organisations
VI Solutions and research Presents two distinct solutions to overcome barriers posed by privacy to public health 
research, and gather participant views on usefulness, usability and preference for each
VII Qualitative component Allows participants to provide views and opinions on knowledge of privacy and 
confidentiality issues/legislation, impact of privacy, proposed research and solutions, 
and additional thoughts or comments
VIII Further participation and contact Allows participants to provide contact information if they choose, for follow-up, 
updates, or piloting of potential solution(s)
* For all participants: first name; last name; initials; sex; date of birth; date of death; registered GP or family physician; street address; postal code; 
community name; city/town/village; region/geographic area; latitude/longitude.
For Canadian participants: provincial health insurance plan number; hospital ID.
For UK participants: old NHS number; new NHS numberPage 3 of 9
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all data collected, and the protection of any personal data
provided under Canadian and UK law. Failure to success-
fully complete either of these two requirements resulted
in termination of the survey. After consenting, partici-
pants were given the option to select their country and
language of choice, and the relevant survey then com-
menced.
All questions included a "Skip" option. Progress through
the survey required the selection of a response for each
question, and participants could terminate the survey at
any time or complete it over multiple sessions, at their
convenience. Questions were not randomized or alter-
nated, but adaptive questioning was utilized. Question
types varied, and included single-choice, multiple-choice,
scale, and free-form response questions, thereby collect-
ing both quantitative and qualitative responses. There was
typically only one question per screen with multiple
potential responses, the maximum number of which was
17. Depending on the responses of the participants, the
survey was distributed over approximately 40 screens.
Key questions addressed by the survey included the fol-
lowing:
- Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data,
including spatial data?
- What spatial resolution is ideal for public health
research?
- Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public
health practice?
- How knowledgeable do public health professionals con-
sider themselves on privacy?
- What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of
personally identifiable data?
- What are the views of the public health community on
public awareness and perceptions?
- Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated,
anonymised data?
Collected responses were analysed using basic descriptive
statistics and non-parametric methods in SAS 9.2. The
Checklist for Reporting Results of Internet E-Surveys
(CHERRIES) [39] was used as a guideline in the reporting
of the web-based survey methodology.
Results
Of 112 invitees in Canada and 75 in the UK, 66 (59%)
and 28 (37%) participated in the survey, respectively. Of
the Canadian participants, three responded to the French
version. The completion proportion for Canada was 91%,
and 86% for the UK.
There were no differences in the distribution of roles
reported by participants in both countries, with most par-
ticipants (49% in Canada; 64% in the UK) identifying
their main role as falling within the research and analysis
domain (Table 2). Participant expertise varied, and
included aboriginal health (Canada only), chronic dis-
eases, paediatric public health, infectious diseases, dental
public health, emergency preparedness and response,
environmental public health, ethics and public health
law, food and nutrition, health services, injuries and disa-
bilities, mental health and substance misuse, social deter-
minants of health, surveillance, and education.
No response differences were observed between the two
countries on each of the key questions, and the overall,
combined results are therefore reported. A summary of
the findings is given in Table 3.
Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data, 
including spatial data?
Almost all participants identified a need for personally
identifiable data (PID) in their roles; only one Canadian
participant indicated no need for PID. Five Canadian par-
ticipants and one UK participant chose not to answer the
question. In total 93% of participants indicated a require-
ment for PID in their public health activities.
What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research?
All participants identified geographic location of health
data as a requirement for their roles or organisation.
When asked "...what level of geography would you ideally
like to visualise your data and/or conduct spatial analy-
ses," 69% of respondents identified "latitude and longi-
tude, exact street address, or exact household."
Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public 
health practice? AND How knowledgeable do public 
health professionals consider themselves on privacy?
When asked "Are you or have you been restricted in your
use of GIS for any public health activity because of privacy
concerns (i.e. map or data might identify an individual or
community)?" 79% of respondents marked "YES".
Of 83 participants who responded to the question "In
your opinion, do current restrictions to PID pose an
obstacle to any aspects of public health practice?" 59
(71%) agreed, rating the obstacle severity at 6 or higher.
Of these 59, 36 (61%) rated their knowledge of privacyPage 4 of 9
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higher, with a mean score of 7.5 (std = 1.0) and a median
score of 7.
Using the median, respondents with a self-rated knowl-
edge score lower than 7 were classified as "low" on knowl-
edge (47%), while those at or above the median score
were classified as "high" (53%). Those classified as high
were more likely to rate privacy as an obstacle (one-sided
Wilcoxon exact P < 0.001). A trend was evident for the
overall correlation between restriction score and self-rated
privacy knowledge score (Spearman r = 0.22, P = 0.057).
What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of 
personally identifiable data?
The most common obstacles were reported as bureaucracy
and legislation by 33% and 25% of the participants,
respectively. Other responses included public disap-
proval/paranoia (15%), practitioner paranoia (7%), lack
of knowledge (6%), combination of these factors (4%),
other (2%), and none (skipped question, 7%).
What are the views of the public health community on 
public awareness and perceptions?
Fifty seven percent of participants felt that under 10% of
the public population is aware of the impact of restricted
access to PID on public health practice; 74% felt it to be
under 20%, and 84% felt the proportion to be less than
30% (cumulative frequencies). Most identified education
Table 2: Number and percent of survey participants by main role and geographical scope
Main Role
Scope Strategic decision/
policy maker
Manager/
Coordinator
Consultant Research & 
Analysis
Front-Line Responder/
Patient Care/Clinical
Other
Canadian Participants
North American or 
National
3 (4.5%) 6 (9%) - 9 (13.6%) 1 (1.5%) 2 (3.0%)
Provincial/Territorial 1 (1.5%) 3 (4.5%) 4 (6.1%) 6 (9.1%) - 2 (3.0%)
Local/Regional 2 (3.0%) 7 (10.6%) 1 (1.5%) 17 (25.8%) 1 (1.5%) 1 (1.5%)
Totals 6 (9.1%) 16 (24.2%) 5 (7.6%) 32 (48.5%) 2 (3.0%) 5 (7.6%)
UK Participants
European or 
National
1 (3.6%) 1 (3.6%) - 1 (3.6%) - -
Regional 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (7.1%) 12 (42.9%) - -
Local 2 (7.1%) - - 4 (14.3%) - 1 (3.6%)
Totals 5 (17.9%) 2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%) 17 (60.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.6%)
*One UK participant who identified a main role in research and analysis declined a response to the question on scope.
Table 3: Summary of findings
Question Response Summary†
1. Is there a requirement for personally identifiable data? Yes (93%)
2. What spatial resolution is ideal for public health research? Lat/Long or address (69%)
3. Is privacy perceived to be a significant obstacle to public health practice? Yes (71%)
4. How knowledgeable do public health professionals consider themselves on privacy? High Knowledge* (53%)
5. What is the most critical obstacle to the access and use of personally identifiable data? Bureaucracy
Legislation
(33%)
(25%)
6. What are the views of the public health community on public awareness and perceptions? Less than 30% of the public is aware (84%)
7. Which is preferred: raw, case level data, or aggregated, anonymised data? Raw, case-level data (66%)
†Numbers in parentheses are the percent of participants who responded as described
*Participants rating their knowledge as high were also more likely to rate privacy as a more severe obstacle (P < 0.001)Page 5 of 9
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narios, etc) as the best methods to increase this propor-
tion. When then asked what proportion of the public they
felt would allow the use of their PID if they were educated
on the usefulness of such data to public health practice,
67% said 50% or higher.
Which is preferred: raw, case-level data, or aggregated, 
anonymised data?
More respondents identified a preference for having
access to granular-level rather than aggregate data (53 vs.
27; 66% of those responding to this question).
Discussion
This survey and user-needs assessment on privacy and
public health shows a definite requirement by public
health professionals – in various fields and positions in
both Canada and the UK – for personally identifiable
data, including spatial data. The requirement for this spa-
tial data is at its most granular level – latitude and longi-
tude, or exact street address – which necessarily
compromises patient privacy. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that public health professionals perceive privacy to
be a significant obstacle to public health practice.
There are those who would argue that this perception is
the product of a lack of understanding of the legislation
and regulations by the public health community. The
results of this research, however, indicate the contrary.
Not only did public health professionals in both countries
generally rate themselves high on knowledge of privacy
legislation and related issues, but those with the highest
self-rated scores also tended to rate privacy as more of an
obstacle. That these self-ratings of knowledge are not rep-
resentative of actual knowledge remains possible.
Participants perceived the most critical obstacles to shar-
ing or acquisition of health data with PID to be bureauc-
racy, followed by legislation.
Bureaucracy surrounding health research in both Canada
and the UK generally revolves around data ownership,
academic competitiveness, ethics review boards or com-
mittees, and in particular, requirements for informed con-
sent, even if they compromise public health, or are not in
the best interests of the patients involved [40-42]. Since
seeking subject consent with every new hypothesis to be
tested or model to be developed is an impossible task,
some have suggested that thought be given to "blanket"
consent. At the Canadian Institutes for Health Research
(CIHI) 2003 workshop on the legal and ethical issues fac-
ing the Canadian Lifelong Health Initiative [43], partici-
pants spent some time discussing such issues, only to
emphasise the importance of the establishment of ethical
governance and structure; essentially, more necessary
bureaucracy. Interestingly, while the debate continues, a
relatively recent survey found that most of the British pub-
lic did not consider the use of their National Cancer Reg-
istry PID for public health research and surveillance to be
an invasion of their privacy [30]. While the ethics of blan-
ket consent are not discussed in this study, it is nonethe-
less offered as a potential solution in light of the
requirements of the public health community. This does
not, however, address other issues of data ownership and
control that contribute to the bureaucratic debate.
While many individuals recognised the importance of pri-
vacy legislation, participants generally indicated a concern
and, in some cases, first-hand frustration that legislation
unduly restricts public health activities, compromising
surveillance and research. Many phrases were used by
respondents to describe the implications of privacy legis-
lation on public health, including, among others:
"increasingly restrictive;" "serious;" "incomplete;"
"fuzzy;" "does more harm than good;" "two-edged
sword;" "causes challenges;" "delays and restricts access
[to data];" " [is a] hindrance to the improvement and effi-
ciency of public health;" "disappointing;" "frustrating;"
"difficult to interpret;" "very worrisome;" "disadvantages
the public interest;" "not properly understood;" "over-
protective;" "limiting;" "hinders knowledge;" and "used
as an excuse not to share data." A large proportion of the
public health community represented in this sample
clearly expressed major concerns with the impact of pri-
vacy legislation on their work – both in Canada, and in
the UK – in spite of having a good understanding and
acceptance of its purpose and necessity. It is also impor-
tant for legislation to be written in an unambiguous man-
ner that is clearly understood by both public health
professionals and the general public [4].
Public health professionals are largely of the opinion that
the general public's level of awareness of the impact of
restricted access to PID on public health practice is
extremely low. Surveys by the Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner in Canada [44] repeatedly show that the major-
ity of Canadians surveyed (up to 80%) place an extremely
high level of importance on strong laws to protect per-
sonal information, particularly health information, and
that they feel that the level of protection of their personal
information has declined over the past ten years. Yet inter-
estingly, only 20% are clearly aware of existing laws, and
even fewer (12%) are aware of their rights around the col-
lection, use and disclosure of this information. The "need
to raise Canadians' awareness about the current laws in
place and what their rights are" [44] must therefore be
coupled with the corresponding need to address this from
within the context of public health requirements.Page 6 of 9
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data users, policy makers and politicians, was not surpris-
ingly identified by participants as a potential solution.
Participants put emphasis on the utilisation of the media
to educate and increase awareness, as well as demonstrat-
ing the impact of a lack of data, and the benefits of its use
when available. Demonstration of the benefits to the indi-
vidual (e.g. streamlining of the system, not being asked
for personal information with every visit to a new clini-
cian, improved dissemination of public health informa-
tion and intelligence directly to the public) was also
offered as a solution, and summed up by one participant
in the phrase "seeing is believing". It is worth noting,
however, that a number of participants displayed a certain
level of pessimism that until a crisis or extreme event
occurs, no amount of education or awareness-increasing
activities would make a difference.
Public health professionals generally prefer disaggregate,
case-level data, but access to this data is an issue. The lim-
itations imposed by privacy on public health have
resulted in the development of a variety of techniques for
data anonymisation [15,23,45]. However, all unavoida-
bly have their issues, risks and limitations, and there is
currently no framework to guide public health profession-
als in their appropriate use and interpretation.
Generalisability
Although the findings of this paper may be generalisable
to public health professionals in Canada and the UK,
issues of privacy and public health are not unique to these
countries. Privacy is defined as a fundamental human
right in the legislation of many countries, and the concept
is enshrined in Article 12 of the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [46] and Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights [47]. Similarly, public
health is an international discipline; both diseases and
information are ubiquitous, and neither is constrained by
political boundaries and oceans. The increasing require-
ment for spatial data and its inherent clash with privacy
legislation therefore extend beyond the UK and Canadian
contexts, and the results, requirements and conclusions
drawn from this research can be generalised to wherever
such a clash exists. The implementation of solutions by
national governments may be further exacerbated by
issues of social political trust. General public distrust in
government initiatives and motives, such as in most coun-
tries of the European Union, Canada, and the United
States [48,49], complicates changes that may be perceived
by the public to be intrusions of privacy. Such issues may
currently be less of a concern in countries such as Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, where social
political trust, though declining, has traditionally tended
to be much higher [50-53]. However, even in such nations
where privacy and health have traditionally not clashed,
increased international data sharing requirements and
spatial data implications may pose unanticipated and
challenging obstacles.
Limitations
No comprehensive lists of public health and health GIS
professionals were found in either country, so it was not
possible to invite a random sample. In addition, the
response rate in the UK was relatively low, and it is there-
fore uncertain that the sample is representative of all pub-
lic health professionals in the two countries. However,
responses between the two countries were consistent, with
no significant differences.
Since knowledge of privacy legislation and policies was
based on self-rated scores, a thorough review and assess-
ment of privacy legislation as it pertains to public health
practice is required in both Canada and the UK to validate
the findings of this survey.
A number of limitations and issues pertaining to the web-
survey were identified. Most notable of these was the pres-
ence of a scroll bar in sections II and III which most par-
ticipants missed, thereby eliminating the ability to capture
items in reference to "place", such as usefulness. However,
these items were also captured more broadly in other sec-
tions of the survey. Other issues involved the inability of
the architecture to support various designs and types of
questions that would have facilitated the completion of
the survey, and shortened the length of time required. Par-
ticipants also noted frustration with the navigation and
structure of the survey pages. A document outlining these
issues and others was submitted to the ALPHA team after
the initial pilot for future enhancements to the architec-
ture.
Conclusion
It is clear that privacy is perceived to be a major obstacle
and issue for public health – the literature illustrates it,
and the current study provides both quantitative and
qualitative evidence. Together, these provide a more holis-
tic portrayal of public health community viewpoints, and
can be used to educate the public, and as evidence for
decision makers to implement changes in policies and
legislation. The clash between a requirement for person-
ally identifiable data – including exact, individual loca-
tion – by public health professionals, and the limitations
imposed by privacy and its associated bureaucracy, must
be addressed and appropriate solutions developed, partic-
ularly given the increasing utilisation of geographic infor-
mation systems in public health and the imminent
completion of comprehensive electronic health systems.
Privacy legislation is critical for the protection of this fun-
damental human right, and to prevent the abuse of per-
sonal information, particularly in the health field.Page 7 of 9
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requirements of public health practice if the health of
societies and populations is to be maintained and
improved. Since health is not limited by political bound-
aries, this must be pursued at an international level, and
solutions must address these perceptions in the public
health community, simplify the bureaucratic process, pro-
mote multidisciplinary discussions between legislators,
bureaucrats and the public health community, educate
communities, and develop and provide public health pro-
fessionals with toolsets, algorithms and guidelines for
using and reporting on disaggregate data. While the
results of this study should inform and justify the devel-
opment of techniques that better anonymise health data
with minimal impact on its integrity and frameworks for
implementing them, it seems fitting to echo the warning
of Curtis et al: "...health and spatial scientists should be
proactive and suggest a series of point level spatial confi-
dentiality guidelines before governmental decisions are
made which may be reactionary toward the threat of
revealing confidential information, thereby imposing dra-
conian limits on research using a GIS [27]."
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